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The Jury is Out: Mandating PreTreatment Arbitration Clauses in
Patient Intake Contracts
SARAH SACHS*

I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, more than two hundred thousand people are killed and more than
one hundred and thirty thousand people are injured by medical error, much of which
is preventable.1 Traditionally, the tort system provided means of recovery for
wrongful deaths and patient injuries through malpractice claims. However, in an
era where practitioners are attempting to deter publicity, jury awards, punitive damages, extensive discovery, and class actions, arbitration is viewed as a shield from
these “evils.”2
Mandatory arbitration clauses have become ubiquitous in a broad range of industries, including the healthcare industry.3 Doctors, hospitals, and health plans are
following the lead of other industries by requiring plan enrollees and patients to
agree to mandatory arbitration of disputes prior to receiving treatment.4 Arbitration
clauses emerging in the healthcare setting are in many cases mandatory and binding.5 These clauses are embedded in health plan contracts with insurance purchasers and presented to patients by hospitals and physicians at the outset of treatment.6
Such clauses stipulate that all future disputes between the patient and the hospital
or physician must be resolved through mandatory arbitration, which results in parties waiving their right to trial or judicial oversight of their disputes.7
Unfortunately, most patients are unaware they are waiving their right to a jury
trial or judicial oversight of their disputes when signing health providers’ patient
intake contracts. A vast majority of patients do not read medical disclosures, or
have the sophistication to understand the information contained within them.8 Even
if patients were to read the fine print of health providers’ contracts, patients are still
likely to fail to recognize that the contract contained an arbitration clause. 9 Further,
* B.A., University of Missouri-Columbia 2016; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law,
2019. I would like to thank the Editorial Board of the Journal of Dispute Resolution for their time and
effort editing this Comment. I would also like to thank my family for their endless support and dedicate
this Comment in memory of my mother, Shelly Sachs.
1. Lydia Nussbaum, Trial and Error: Legislating ADR for Medical Malpractice Reform, 76 Md. L.
Rev. 247, 248-49 (2017).
2. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1631, 1631
(2005).
3. Id.
4. Elizabeth Rolph et. al., Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myths and Reality, 60 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 154 (1997).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Myriam E. Gilles, Operation Arbitration: Privatizing Medical Malpractice Claims, 15
THEORETICAL INQUIRES IN LAW 671, 687 (2014).
9. Id.
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if a patient recognized and refused to sign a mandatory arbitration clause, doctors
and hospitals containing mandatory arbitration clauses in their patient intake contracts reserve the right to forfeit treatment if the patient refuses to sign. Refusal to
sign is a ground to refuse treatment, unless the patient faces a medical emergency.
Doctors, hospitals, and health plans requiring mandatory arbitration concern patient
advocates because often times patients are not in a position to negotiate at the time
the contract is executed.10 In fact, no negotiation occurs when patients sign arbitration clauses buried in a doctor’s office or hospital admissions paperwork.11 The
repercussions on patients forced into mandatory and binding arbitration after a dispute arises from medical treatment can be catastrophic for patients and their loved
ones, while beneficial for doctors, hospitals, and health plan providers.
This Comment advocates against the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in
healthcare providers’ patient intake contracts and discusses the interplay between
federal and state statutes that create disparities in enforceability and unenforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses in state courts. Part II discusses the history of
mandatory arbitration and its development in healthcare providers’ patient intake
contracts. Part III examines state statutory limitations on pre-treatment arbitration
clauses. Finally, Part IV addresses how courts analyze these agreements and possible approaches to avoid mandatory arbitration arising in healthcare providers’ patient intake contracts.

II. HISTORY OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND PATIENT
INTAKE CONTRACTS
The United States Supreme Court has taken a “bipolar approach to arbitration.”12 During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts were hostile
towards arbitration13 agreements.14 However, in recent years the Supreme Court
has largely supported arbitration agreements, even when mandatory.15 Courts enforcing mandatory arbitration clauses in healthcare providers’ patient intake contracts are governed and guided by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

A. The Federal Arbitration Act
Federal support for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) agreements, such as
arbitration clauses, surfaced in 1925 when Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act.16 After the enactment of the act, courts generally disfavored arbitration clauses and deemed them unenforceable because the courts viewed arbitration

10. Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 275.
11. Id.
12. Lauren Gaffney, The Circle of Assent: How “Agreement” Can Save Mandatory Arbitration in
Long-Term Care Contracts, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (2009).
13. Arbitration is defined as “a dispute-resolution process in which the disputing parties choose one
or more neutral parties to make a final and binding decision resolving the dispute.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
14. See Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A, v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir. 1942);
Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 91, 98 (2012).
15. Id.; (Arbitration is considered mandatory when required by contract.)
16. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C.).
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as encroaching on its domain of jurisdiction.17 However, starting in 1947, courts
began to favor arbitration agreements when the enactment was codified under the
FAA.18 The FAA governs the enforcement of contractual agreements to arbitrate
disputes involving maritime transactions and interstate commerce.19 Section 2 of
the FAA, which is the “primary substantive provision of the Act,”20 provides that
arbitration agreements in writing are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.21 Under Section 2, the Supreme Court has held the FAA as a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”22 After a series of Supreme Court rulings, the reach
of the FAA statute has expanded over the years.
Beginning in the late 1950s, the Supreme Court deliberated on a number of
cases interpreting the FAA.23 The Court held that the FAA is a substantive rather
than procedural law,24 and that it was enacted by Congress pursuant to its power to
regulate interstate commerce.25 These rulings established that the FAA preempts
state law to the extent that state law is inconsistent with the FAA or “to the extent
that it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”26 Therefore, the FAA gave courts broad
preemptive power over state laws disfavoring arbitration. Following these rulings,
many states consented to the federal government’s endorsement of arbitration and
adopted their own versions of the FAA.
As states began adopting their own versions of the FAA, the Supreme Court
enhanced the FAA’s strength by further preempting state law. For example, in Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto, the Court held that Montana’s state statute treating
arbitration clauses differently than standard contract language was inconsistent with
the FAA.27 The Court concluded that the state statute placed special burdens on
arbitration clauses that conditioned the enforcement of such provisions on the compliance with the state statutory requirements, and therefore preempting the FAA.28
The decision in Casarotto established that state statutes’ role in interpreting arbitration clauses is limited, and that basic issues of enforceability of contractual arbitration clauses are answered by federal law.29 Casarotto opened the door for states to
limit the enforceability of arbitration clauses. Yet, it left unanswered bright-line
rules for state statutes to preempt the FAA.
Recent state court decisions attempted to clarify the power left to states in determining the validity of arbitration agreements. While Casarotto seems to establish that the FAA preempts all areas of law that Congress has addressed in the statute, courts have held that only state statutes that are inconsistent with the FAA are

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Gaffney, supra note 12, at 1023.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2018).
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2018).
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Contr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24.
Rolph, supra note 4, at 160.
See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-05 (1967).
Rolph, supra note 4, at 160.
517 U.S. 681, 681-82 (1996).
Id. at 682.
Rolph, supra note 4, at 160.
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preempted.30 Prior to Casarotto, some state courts interpreted the FAA’s preemptive effect to preclude application of state contract law, despite the fact that the FAA
did not address issues of state contract law.31 However, Casarotto identifies unconscionability as a state law doctrine which “may be applied to invalidate arbitration
clauses without contravening Section 2,” because the FAA does not address that
issue.32 Therefore, state courts may generally regulate arbitration clauses “under
general contract law principles,”33 such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability without conflicting with the FAA.34 However, state courts cannot invalidate arbitration
clauses solely based on state laws specific to arbitration. The tension between the
FAA and state statutes may motivate doctors and hospitals to add pre-treatment
arbitration clauses to their patient intake contracts because the FAA’s broad reach
is likely to preempt state statutes limiting arbitration clauses.

B. Use of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Patient Intake Contracts
The use of alternative dispute resolution emerged in the healthcare industry
after unexpected growth in medical malpractice claims in the 1970s.35 Legislatures
believed that large jury awards led to rapid growth in physician malpractice insurance premiums and in some states threatened specialty care.36 State legislatures
responded to the increase in medical malpractice claims by implementing forms of
alternative dispute resolution as well as tort reform to control the risk and costs of
large jury verdicts.37 State legislatures implemented shortened statutes of limitations, caps on damages, collateral source rules requiring courts to avoid double
compensation for the same injury, and mediation and binding arbitration as a favored means to resolve disputes.38 These legislative initiatives intended to make it
harder for patients to bring medical malpractice claims and reduce the rising cost of
medical expenses.39
With the continued expansion of healthcare services, the potential for disputes
has drastically increased despite implementation of state legislation.40 As insurance
plans and providers attempt to contain the cost of healthcare, a whole new class of
disputes arose over coverage.41 Insurance companies and managed care plans created a new class of disputes by denying treatment to patients and acting as treatment
decision-makers.42 Denial of treatment or coverage can result in patients forgoing
necessary treatment, which can result in further health complications and even
death. As a result, some patients are more likely to challenge the medical judgments
and competence of providers. Thus, doctors, hospitals, and health plans, to find a
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 161.
33. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
34. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687.
35. Rolph, supra note 4, at 153.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Scott Forehand, Helping the Medicine Go Down: How a Spoonful of Mediation Can Alleviate
the Problems of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 907, 912-13 (1999).
39. Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 251.
40. Rolph, supra note 4, at 154.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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more efficient, more predictable, and arguably less threatening mechanism for dispute resolution, are following the lead of certain other industries by requiring patients to agree to pre-treatment mandatory binding arbitration.43
While the use of mandatory arbitration clauses may not be an industry norm,
the use of such clauses is on the rise.44 The use of pre-treatment clauses are popping
up in physician and patient contracts, physician and malpractice insurance provider
contracts, as well as patient and insurance company or HMO contracts. State legislatures’ advancement of these clauses in the healthcare setting is evident through
notable nationwide support of state statutes regulating pre-treatment and post-treatment arbitration clauses.
Six states have authorized pre-treatment arbitration clauses by statute—Alaska,
California, Colorado, Louisiana, South Dakota and Utah.45 The statutes in these
states require one of the following provisions: (1) right of revocation;46 (2) notification that treatment is conditioned on acceptance of the agreement;47 and/or (3)
notice of waiver of rights.48 The California and Colorado statutes contain mandatory language that must be included in the contract for the pre-treatment arbitration
clause to be held enforceable.49 Michigan, Wyoming, and Maine had pre-treatment
arbitration statutes that were later repealed.50
Sixteen other states have statutes which provide that parties may agree to arbitrate post-treatment medical disputes.51 Some of these statutes also provide mandatory language that must be included in the contract for the arbitration clause to be
held enforceable. Eighteen other states use other forms of alternative dispute resolution such as mediation and panels to resolve post-treatment medical disputes.52
43. Id.
44. A. Thomas Pedroni & Ruth F. Vadi, Mandatory Arbitration or Mediation of Health Care Liability
Claims?, 39 MD. B.J. 54, 56 (2006).
45. Id.
46. Id. (Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 6.5.485); California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 1363.1); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-403); Louisiana (LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:4230 et seq.); South Dakota
(S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25B-1 et seq.); and Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78b-3-416 et seq.); Right of
revocation allows a patient to revoke from the contract without the need to provide any reason.
47. Id. (Alaska, Colorado, and Utah).
48. Id. (California, Colorado, and Utah).
49. Id.
50. Pedroni & Vita, supra note 45, at 57. (Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 60.5040); Wyoming
(WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-1502); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2701-15).
51. Heather Morton, Medical Liability/ Malpractice ADR and Screening Panels Statutes, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF ST. LEGISLATORS (2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medical-liability-malpractice-adr-and-screening-panels-statutes.aspx; Alabama (A LA. CODE § 65-485); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6803); Florida (FLA. STAT. § 766.207); Maryland (MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-28-01); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.22); Virginia (VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.12); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-61); Illinois (750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15);
Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7001); Louisiana (LA.. STAT. ANN. § 9:4230); New Jersey (N.J. REV.
STAT. § 2A:23A-20); New York (N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3045); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.60);
South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-120); Texas (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §74.451);
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70A.010).
52. Id.; Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190c); District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 162821); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-11); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 6-1001); Indiana (IND. CODE § 3418-8-4); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3413); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §2851); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60B); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-101); Nebraska
(NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2840); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.081); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 519-B:1); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-14); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 3242-01); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 31.250); Pennsylvania (40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.714); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 655.42).
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The remaining ten states only have general arbitration statutes, which are applied to
guide enforcement of arbitration agreements in all industries including disputes
arising in health care contracts.53 State statutes requiring the use of some form of
alternative dispute resolution, whether it be arbitration or mediation, have drastically increased as the healthcare industry has evolved into a business focused on
volume and profitability of services provided.

i. Consumer Versus Patient
Profit driven interests in the healthcare industry alter the physician-patient relationship into a producer-consumer relationship. Doctors, hospitals, and health
plan providers blur the line between patients and consumers by including pre-treatment mandatory arbitration clauses. Unlike companies such as banks, phone companies, internet service providers, and e-commerce merchants, where mandatory
arbitration clauses are commonplace in consumer contracts, the healthcare industry
provides a service that deviates from a typical producer-consumer relationship.
The producer-consumer relationship assumes, perhaps incorrectly, that both
parties have equal bargaining power.54 Where there is unequal bargaining power,
however, the law attempts to compensate for some inequality in power by regulating producers to an extent so that consumers are able to make informed and voluntary choices.55 However, consumer protection laws are solely concerned with the
consumer’s freedom to make voluntary choices, not their possession of specialized
knowledge.56
The patient-physician relationship is different because it assumes inequality
between the patient and the physician.57 The physician is likely to have more
knowledge about medical information than the patient, thus imposing a fiduciary
duty on the physician to apply their expertise in the best interest of the patient according to professional standards.58 The presumption that patients are on unequal
bargaining grounds does not suggest patients are incapable of making medical decisions. Rather the assumption suggests that patients lack access to specialized
knowledge other than reliance on their physician. Therefore, the law treats consumers and patients differently. Whereas consumers do not solely rely on producers
to make their purchasing decisions, patients are likely to solely rely on physicians’
specialized knowledge in order to make informed medical decisions.59
Transforming the physician-patient relationship into a producer-consumer relationship through mandatory arbitration clauses abuses the unequal bargaining

53. Id. (Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee).
54. See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Standards of Care and Standard Form Contracts: Distinguishing Patient Rights and Consumer Rights in Managed Care, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 8
(1998).
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id.
58. Id. (“[The] inherent imbalance in knowledge and skill is a defining characteristic of the physicianpatient relationship. Moreover, patients are usually sick and not able to function at their own normal
capacity.”)
59. Id. at 9.
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power of patients. Furthermore, treating patients as consumers takes medical malpractice claims primarily rooted in tort law to be governed by contract law.60 In
other words, even though the merits of the claim will still be governed by tort law,
the initial proceedings are governed by contract law. The initial proceedings governed by contract law could result in different treatment of the claim by the arbitration panel, depending on the contractual provisions of the agreement.

ii. Tort Law versus Contract Law
Medical malpractice liability is grounded in tort law.61 The objective of the
tort system is to compensate patients for their injuries and damages sustained by a
negligent party. Therefore, the tort system acts in two parts: To dispense “corrective
justice” and to deter negligence.62 Negligent medical care or medical malpractice
is generally the failure to do what a reasonable doctor or provider in the same situation would have done under similar circumstances.63 A patient is only entitled to
compensation for financial losses, such as lost earnings, medical bills, and noneconomic damages for pain and suffering, when a judge or jury finds that the patient’s injury was caused by the negligence of the doctor’s substandard care.64
The emerging use of mandatory binding arbitration takes medical malpractice
claims outside the realm of tort law and restricts such claims to contract law. Combining claims of health plans grounded in contract law and patient treatment
grounded in tort law, further complicates resolution of medical malpractice claims
to the detriment of patients. For example, in Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan
of Kansas City, Inc.,65 the Eight Circuit held that a medical malpractice claim was
not valid because it involved an HMO provider’s refusal to pay for treatment outside
its network. The health plan denied surgery at an out-of-network hospital, eventually resulting in the patient’s death. The court evaluated the denial of treatment by
the health plan as a contractual issue. Therefore, the claim was not evaluated under
a negligence standard pursuant to tort law, but could only be challenged or voided
by contract law.66 The court’s holding resulted in no recovery for the injury sustained by the patient. Distinguishing between contract law and tort law is outcome
determinative for a patient’s damages recovery. Allowing contract law to govern,
often results in no recovery for patients and full protection of doctors, hospitals, and
health plans. Mandatory arbitration protects doctors, hospitals, and health plans at
the expense of patients.

60. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 254 (2004).
61. Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 254.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 255.
64. Id.
65. Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat’l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993).
66. See id.
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III. REGULATORY TENSION BETWEEN STATE STATUTES, THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON
ACT
A. Texas Medical Liability Act
In the spring of 1977, the Texas legislature passed the Medical Liability and
Insurance Improvement Act (MLIIA), which was codified as Article 4590i of the
Texas Revised Civil Statutes.67 During the intervening decades, parts of the statute
have been declared unconstitutional and other parts have been judicially redefined.68 In 2003, the legislature made changes to the MLIA and re-codified it in the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code.69 As part of the revisions, the Texas Medical
Liability Act (TMLA) authorized counties to adopt alternative dispute resolution
systems. The statute did not mandate medical malpractice claims to arbitration or
screening panels. However, the statute left it to the discretion of health care providers to utilize ADR procedures, such as mandatory arbitration clauses in patient
intake contracts. The legislature attempted to add a layer of consumer protection
for patients by requiring the signature of the patient’s attorney for the agreement to
be held valid.70 The statute also requires an arbitration agreement to contain written
notice in bold-type, ten-point font that conspicuously warns the patient.71 Despite
efforts to protect patients, issues of enforceability have arisen when arbitration
clauses fail to strictly comply with the TMLA.72
Until recently, Texas’s lower courts routinely rejected the argument that the
FAA preempts strict compliance with the TMLA.73 However, a recent Texas Supreme Court decision changed the landscape for arbitration clauses in medical malpractice claims.74 In Fredricksburg Care Co., L.P. v. Perez,75 the Texas Supreme
Court held that the FAA preempts the more stringent arbitration requirements set
forth in section 74.451 of the TMLA. The Court also held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act (“MFA”)76 does not “reverse preemption” from the FAA.77

i. The Fredricksburg Case
In Fredricksburg, the company moved to compel arbitration based on a preadmission contract signed by the patient.78 Despite the pre-admission arbitration

67. Texas Medical Association, Summary of Texas Medical Professional Liability Law,
https://www.texmed.org/StatuteOfLimitations/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2017).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.451.
71. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.451(a).
72. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.451(b).
73. Michael L. Hood & David M. Merryman, Med Mal Game Changer The Texas Supreme Court
Strikes Down Bar to Arbitration Agreements, 78 TEX. B.J. 638 (2015).
74. Id.
75. Frederickson Care Co., L.P. v. Perez, 461 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. 2015), reh’g denied (June 26, 2015),
cert. denied sub nom; Perez v. Fredericksburg Care Co., L.P., 136 S. Ct. 798 (2016).
76. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015.
77. Fredricksburg, 461 S.W.3d at 513.
78. Id. at 516.
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clause’s failure to strictly comply with the TMLA,79 Fredricksburg asserted that
federal law determined the enforceability of the arbitration clause under the FAA
because the underlying patient-provider transaction involved interstate commerce.80
The beneficiaries did not dispute that the FAA would normally preempt TMLA
section 74.451 because the two laws directly conflicted, and therefore the FAA prevented the arbitration clause from being invalidated.81 However, the beneficiaries
argued that TMLA section 74.451 was part of a state law enacted “for the purpose
of regulating the business of insurance,” which falls under the protection of the
MFA.82 Under the MFA, Congress created an exemption from preemption for any
federal law that can be “construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.”83
The Texas Supreme Court held that the FAA applied and therefore strict compliance of TMLA section 74.451 did not invalidate the arbitration clause.84 The
court acknowledged that the TMLA was enacted with the intent to make health care
more affordable, but held that the legislator’s goal of lowering costs was “too tenuous of a connection to the business of insurance” to qualify for MFA protection.85
The court also concluded that section 74.451, which applies between patients and
providers, has little to do with the relationship between the insurance company and
its policyholders.86
The ruling in Fredricksburg has granted health care providers more flexibility
to adopt pre-treatment arbitration agreements.87 If a health care provider can establish the FAA applies to the arbitration clause and preempts the TMLA, then the
agreement must only satisfy the FAA’s requirements. FAA agreements are still subject to state law contract defenses, but preemption of the TMLA significantly reduces patient safeguards. As a result, many providers may start including arbitration clauses in their pre-treatment contracts with patients.

B. Colorado Health Care Availability Act
The Colorado legislature passed the Health Care Availability Act (HCAA) in
1989.88 In 2003, the legislature amended the HCAA and declared that no individual
or entity, other than the patient’s physician, may be held liable in any medical malpractice claim.89 Similar to the TMLA, the HCAA requires written notice in at least
ten-point font with bold-faced type.90 The Colorado legislature protects patients by
allowing a patient to rescind from the agreement by written notice to the physician
within ninety days after signing the agreement or after release or discharge from the
79. Id.
80. Id. at 516-17. (Fredricksburg Care Company received Medicare payments on behalf of the deceased, which the court found sufficient to establish interstate commerce.)
81. Id. at 517.
82. Id.
83. Fredricksburg, 461 S.W.3d at 517, citing 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
84. Id. at 528.
85. Id. at 524.
86. Id. at 526-27.
87. Hood & Merryman, supra note 74, at 638.
88. 1989 Colo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 1294 (West).
89. The amendment promulgated the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Pediatric Neurosurgery,
P.C. v. Russell, 44 P.3d 1063 (Colo. 2002) (Holding the corporate entity may be held vicariously liable
for negligence through respondent superior).
90. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403.
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hospital.91 Unlike Texas state courts, Colorado state courts have upheld the enforceability of pre-treatment arbitration clauses only when the agreement strictly
complies with the HCAA.
Recently the Colorado Court of Appeals reinforced strict compliance with
HCAA in Fischer v. Colorow Health Care, LLC.92 The court held in Fischer that
the HCAA demands strict compliance with section 13-64-403(4).93 Therefore, noncompliant arbitration clauses will be rendered unenforceable if challenged.

i. The Fischer Case
In Fischer, Colorow Health Care, LLC (Colorow) moved to compel arbitration
and plaintiffs opposed the motion based on noncompliance with HCAA requirements in section 13-64-403(3) and (4).94 The trial court rescinded the arbitration
agreement explaining that “the entity seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement
must be held to strict compliance with [the statutory] requirements.”95 The Court
of Appeals affirmed the order of the trial court denying the motion to compel arbitration. The Court determined that strict compliance was necessary based on the
legislative intent which is focused on ensuring binding arbitration clauses are “voluntary agreement[s] between a patient and health care provider. . . .”96 The Colorado Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Fischer case. However, the current law requires any pre-treatment arbitration clause to strictly comply with HCAA
section 13-64-403.
In Fischer, Colorow did not raise the issue that the arbitration clause is
preempted by the FAA because the contract lacked interstate commerce or maritime
transactions. However, Colorow probably could invoke interstate commerce if the
patient used any form of Medicare or insurance to pay for the health care services.
The Court’s focus on strict compliance versus substantial compliance may have resulted in a different outcome than if the provider argued the FAA preempts the
HCAA.
Eventually state arbitration statutes regulating medical malpractice claims
could come before the United States Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court
rejected to take up an appeal from the Fredricksburg case. However, if other states,
such as the Colorado Supreme Court, uphold strict compliance with state statutes
for arbitration agreements, the United States Supreme Court may take up the issue
to provide guidance on when the FAA preempts state statues enforcement of arbitration clauses in healthcare contracts.

91. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403(3).
92. Fischer v. Colorow Health Care, LLC, 2016 COA 130, cert. granted, No. 16SC814, 2017 WL
825315 (Colo. Feb. 21, 2017).
93. Id. at 8.
94. Id. at 1.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 6-7 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-64-403(1)).
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IV. CHALLENGING MANDATORY ARBITRATION IN PATIENT
INTAKE CONTRACTS
Arbitration clauses are subject to contract law. Therefore, courts must first
determine whether a valid contract exists prior to assessing the validity of the arbitration clause.97 To prove that a valid contract exists, four elements must be met:
(1) the parties possessed the capacity to enter into a contract, (2) the parties mutually
assented, (3) there must be a certain object for the contract, and (4) the contract
must have a lawful purpose.98 If a valid contract does not exist, then a motion to
compel mandatory arbitration is invalid because the FAA “does not require parties
to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.”99
When a valid arbitration clause exists, parties may seek to defeat a motion to
compel arbitration by attempting to escape the purview of the FAA to apply more
favorable state law.100 However, defeating a motion to compel arbitration is difficult because of the FAA’s broad reach.

A. Avoiding The FAA
Avoiding the FAA is advantageous to a party seeking to evade a motion to
compel arbitration because many state laws disfavor arbitration. To avoid applying
the FAA to an arbitration agreement, the party must prove that the underlying transaction does not involve interstate commerce.101 The Supreme Court has interpreted
“interstate commerce” broadly102 and construed Section 2 of the FAA as applying
to every arbitration agreement that private parties entered into with the full reach of
the Commerce Clause.103 Applying the reach of the Commerce Clause to the FAA
has expanded the applicable scope even further. Courts have upheld arbitration
clauses in individual cases without a showing of any specific impact upon interstate
commerce. Under the Commerce Clause, the FAA is invoked when a party proves
a transaction represents a general practice subject to federal control and the general
practice substantially affects interstate commerce.104 Therefore, a physician’s clinic
or a hospital’s interstate transactions will likely satisfy the “interstate commerce”
requirement, and the FAA will govern the pre-treatment arbitration agreement between the physician and patient.105

97. See TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Rooks, 604 S.E.2d 562 (2004).
98. See Wallace v. Sherve Mem’l Library, 79 F.3d 427, 430 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996).
99. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).
100. Gaffney, supra note 12, at 1029.
101. 9 U.S.C. § 2; See Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 268.
102. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 268 (holding “a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce” should be read broadly to extend the FAA to the outer limits of “Congress’ Commerce
Clause power”).
103. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987).
104. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003).
105. McGuffey Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. Gibson ex rel. Jackson, 864 So. 2d 1061, 1063 (Ala. 2003)
(holding Medicare funds moving across state lines should be considered to establish the interstate commerce connection); Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983 (Ala. 2004) (holding that
nursing home services involved interstate commerce is unquestionably economic in nature under Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., and can be within reach of the Commerce Clause); In re Nexion Health at
Humble, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 67, 68 (Tex. 2005, as supplemented on denial of reh’g (Oct. 14, 2005) (holding
Medicare funds crossing state lines makes the pre-admissions contract involve interstate commerce).
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Courts have considered the receipt of Medicaid or Medicare funds, receipt of
materials from other states, and any out-of-state offices in determining whether an
agreement involved “interstate commerce.”106 Further, parties wishing to compel
arbitration can argue that their facility is subject to federal regulation, which subjects their arbitration clause to be governed by the FAA. However, under rare circumstances, parties may escape the FAA in an “involving commerce” argument. In
Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. P’ship, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
accepting Medicare and Medicaid payments was insufficient to invoke the FAA
“interstate commerce” clause.107 While other states have recognized Medicare or
Medicaid funds to trigger preemption of contrary state law to the FAA, the Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to follow such precedent because the United States
Supreme Court has not ruled that Medicare or Medicaid is “an exercise of Congress’
Commerce Clause power.”108 Thus far, no other state has followed Oklahoma’s
interpretation of interstate commerce.109 Therefore, it is largely difficult for the
parties to escape the broad reach of the FAA.

B. Standard Contract Defenses
Courts can refuse to enforce pre-treatment mandatory arbitration clauses in patient intake contracts based on standard contract defenses, such as fraud, duress and
unconscionability without contravening the FAA.110 The most compelling standard
contract defenses in pre-treatment arbitration contracts are unconscionability and
lack of capacity.

i. Unconscionability
Unconscionability111 arguments appear particularly promising to pre-treatment
mandatory arbitration clauses because pre-dispute clauses are frequently found in
contracts that are adhesive112 in nature.113 However, unconscionability arguments
are rarely successful because unequal bargaining power or unfairness is usually not
enough to invalidate a contract.114
106. See Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 329 (1991) (holding purchase of out-of-state
medicines and acceptance of out-of-state insurance established interstate commerce); Triad Health
Mgmt. of Ga., III, LLC v. Johnson, 679 S.E.2d 785, 788 (Ga. App. 2009) (applied FAA to nursing home
contract when facility purchased supplies from out-of-state vendors, treated out-of-state patients, and
received Medicaid and Medicare funding); Kansas City Urology, P.A. v. United Healthcare Servs., 261
S.W.3d 7, 10 (Mo. App. 2008) (holding the FAA applies when some of the plaintiffs and the defendants
reside in different states and their activities affect interstate commerce).
107. Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. P’ship, 155 P.3d 16, 31-32 (Okla. 2006).
108. Id. at 29-30.
109. Gaffney, supra note 12, at 1032.
110. See Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Mo. App. 2003).
111. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (Unconscionability is defined as an unfair or oppressive contract to one party).
112. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (An adhesion contract is drafted by one party and
signed by another party with weaker bargaining power. Courts carefully scrutinizes adhesion contracts
and sometimes void provisions because of the possibility of unequal bargaining power, unfairness, and
unconscionability).
113. David Allen Larson & Dr. David Dahl, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: Not Business as Usual,
8 Y.B. on Arb. & Mediation 69, 75 (2016).
114. Id.
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Unconscionability has two elements: procedural and substantive.115 Procedural
unconscionability refers to the contract formation process and may include “fine
print clauses, high pressure sales tactics or unequal bargaining positions.”116 Substantive unconscionability refers to undue harshness in the contract terms.117 A
showing of procedural and substantive unconscionability is considered in determining whether an arbitration clause is unconscionable and void.118
A critical question in determining unconscionability is whether each party
made a meaningful choice. Circumstances surrounding the transaction are considered in evaluating a meaningful choice, such as obvious education or lack of it,
reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or notification of
important terms hidden in fine print or minimized by deceptive sales practices.119
Unconscionability is a powerful defense because it invalidates contract terms “when
a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially
unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms.”120 In such cases,
courts may deem a contract in part or in whole unenforceable.
The nature of pre-treatment patient intake contracts and mandatory arbitration
clauses contained in them place patients at more of a risk of unconscionability. For
example, in Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital, the California Court of Appeals held an
arbitration clause unconscionable when signed by a patient in a hospital admissions
contract. 121 The court held that “a hospital’s standard printed ‘CONDITIONS OF
ADMISSION’ form possesses all the characteristics of a contract of adhesion” because the would-be patient is in no position to reject the proffered agreement, to
bargain with the hospital, or in lieu of agreement to find another hospital.122 Further, the court justified its finding of unconscionability because the patient realistically had no choice but to seek hospital admission as directed by his physician and
sign the printed forms necessary to gain admission.123 Unconscionability can be a
powerful contract defense against standard print forms in patient intake contracts.
However, standard print terms in pre-treatment patient contracts may not always be
held unconscionable if a patient is reasonably aware of the terms and given the opportunity to read the terms.124 Therefore, patients may not rely on an unconscionability defense based solely on a pre-treatment contract containing standard print
terms. Depending on the surrounding circumstances, an unconscionability defense
may or may not be a valid argument to avoid pre-treatment mandatory arbitration
clauses.

ii. Lack of Capacity
A valid arbitration clause requires mutual assent by competent parties at the
time the contract is executed. Challenging an arbitration agreement based on lack
115. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340 (2011).
116. Manfredi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas City, 340 S.W.3d 126, 132 (Mo. App. 2011).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (1965).
120. Id.
121. Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345 (1976).
122. Id. at 357.
123. Id. at 789.
124. Stanley D. Henderson, Contractual Problems in the Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 VA. L. REV. 947, 986 (1972).
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of capacity is a difficult defense because courts assume individuals are competent
to enter contractual relationships.125 A party arguing a contract is unenforceable
because the signor lacked mental capacity bears the burden of proving such incapacity.126 Most courts will void contracts upon adequate showing that a party lacked
mental capacity.127 In the healthcare setting, issues of capacity to consent to pretreatment mandatory arbitration clauses arise uniquely when patients sign contracts
under extreme physical or mental distress.
However, proving lack of capacity because of physical or mental distress is
difficult. Generally, courts have followed the contract principle that “mere weakness of mind or body, or of both, do not constitute what the law regards as a mental
incompetency sufficient to render a contract voidable.”128 Weak-mindedness alone
may not be sufficient to make a contract voidable, but could be highly relevant in
determining overreach or fraud.129
For example, in Kindred Hospitals Limited Partnership v. White,130 the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s finding that an arbitration clause
was void due to lack of capacity when a patient had previously been diagnosed with
Stage III lung cancer and recently undergone a tracheostomy procedure. The Court
of Appeals concluded that the record evidenced the patient was very ill, but that
alone does not equate to lack of capacity to enter a contract.131 The Court distinguishes White from Pikeville Med. Ctr. Inc. v. Bevins.132 In Bevins, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration because the patient was deemed to lack capacity to enter into a complex arbitration
agreement at the patient’s admission to the hospital.133 The Court distinguishes
these two cases by stating, “if substantial evidence supports a lack of capacity, a
finding of lack of capacity could be sustained.”134 A lack of capacity defense is
determined at the discretion of circuit courts. Therefore, while a lack of capacity
defense may be reasonable, because it is at the discretion of the court, it is not necessarily a reliable defense to avoid a motion to compel pre-treatment arbitration
clauses.

125. Autumn Smith, You Can’t Judge Me: Mental Capacity Challenges to Arbitration Provisions, 56
BAYLOR L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2004).
126. Id. at 1056.
127. Id.
128. See 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 10.8 (4th ed. 2017).
129. Id.
130. Kindred Hosps. Ltd. P’ship v. White, 2017 WL 4464339 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2017).
131. Id. at *3 (The circuit court based its conclusion on seven reasons: “1) Medical records indicating
that the patient was awake and alert when she executed the agreement does not necessarily support she
had contractual capacity to enter into the arbitration agreement at that time; 2) The patient’s prescription
glasses had been misplaced; 3) The patient was alone and had no family members to assist her; 4) The
patient was administered pain medications including oxycodone; 5) It was late at night; 6) The patient
had been diagnosed with Stage III lung cancer and had recently undergone a procedure in which she was
subjected to the insertion of a metal tracheostomy tube; and 7) The patient was unable to speak”).
132. Pikeville Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bevins, 2014 WL 5420002 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2014).
133. Id. at *1. (Holding that an individual who was very sick at the time of his admission yet who was
deemed capable of providing responses to questions regarding the course of medical treatment, could
nonetheless be deemed incapable of reviewing and signing a complex contract in which he would be
agreeing to waive a number of substantive rights).
134. Kindred Hosps. Ltd. P’ship, at *7 n.3.
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V. CONCLUSION
As the healthcare crisis continues to develop, health providers will attempt to
lower expenses at any cost. Many health providers view arbitration clauses as a
cost-saver for medical malpractice claims. Therefore, physicians and hospitals are
discretely placing pre-treatment mandatory arbitration clauses in patient intake contracts. Arbitration clauses are becoming more common and could become an accepted practice in the medical field, without patient awareness until after a dispute
arises.
In the healthcare context, patients signing a contract with an arbitration clause
are often the weaker party and have not yet envisioned the possibility of future medical malpractice disputes arising. Pre-treatment mandatory arbitration becomes fundamentally unjust when patients’ rights are inconspicuously taken during vulnerable times. Reforms must take place to protect patients.
Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v.
Brown135 that prohibits states legislatures from implementing laws that make predisputed arbitration clauses in personal injury or wrongful death claims unenforceable, Congress and state legislatures should pass legislation to protect patients.
Congress could prohibit mandatory, pre-treatment, binding arbitration clauses
based on concerns of public policy. Further, state legislatures could pass legislation
that ensures meaningful consent is given during execution of contracts containing
mandatory arbitration. Lastly, educating the public and mandating physicians and
hospital systems to give adequate notice of pre-treatment mandatory arbitration
clauses contained in patient intake contracts can help patients make meaningful
choices in selecting a physician or a hospital system.
At some point all individuals rely on medical care from a physician or a hospital
system. Dependence on physicians and hospital systems is critical to individuals’
well-being. It is vital that the legal system protects vulnerable patients and provides
a fair and impartial forum for redress when medical malpractice claims arise.

135. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012).
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